UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
_______________________________________
)
In the Matter of )
)
Louisiana Energy Services) Docket No. 70-3070
)February 24, 1995
(Claiborne Enrichment Center))
_______________________________________)
TESTIMONY OF DR. ROBERT D. BULLARD
REGARDING CITIZENS AGAINST NUCLEAR TRASH'S
CONTENTION J.9
Q. : Please state your name, affiliation, and qualifications.
A. My name is Robert D. Bullard. I am Ware Professor of Sociology at Clark Atlanta University ("CAU"). Prior to joining the faculty at CAU, I served as professor of sociology at the University of California, Riverside, and visiting professor in the Center for African-American Studies at UCLA. I received my M.A. from Clark Atlanta University and my Ph.D from Iowa State University. I have worked on and conducted research in the areas of urban land use, housing, community development, industrial facility siting, and environmental quality for more than fifteen years.
My scholarship and activities have made me one of the leading experts on environmental justice. I was one of the planners of the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit. I was recently selected to serve on President Clinton's Transition Team in the Natural Resources and Environment Cluster (Departments of Interior, Energy, Agriculture, and Environmental Protection Agency). I currently serve on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Environmental Justice Advisory Council ("NEJAC"), for which I chair the Health and Research Subcommittee.
I am the author of numerous articles, monographs, and scholarly papers that address equity concerns. My People of Color Environmental Groups Directory 1994 is widely used in the environmental and social justice movements. My 1979 study of "Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community" (reported in Sociological Inquiry (1983) and "Invisible Houston: The Black Experience in Boom and Bust" (1987) supported the first lawsuit to use the 1964 civil rights law to challenge environmental discrimination. I have written or edited six books. My book, In Search of the New South: the Black Urban Experience in the 1970s and 1980s (1989) won the 1989 Gustavus Myers Center award for the Study of Human Rights in the United States. My book Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class and Environmental Quality (Westview Press: 1990) has become a standard text in the environmental justice field. My other books include: Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots (South End Press: 1993); Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and Communities of Color (Sierra Club Books, 1994). I was also an editor, with Ruth Ann Shelton, Nestor Rodriguez, Jore R. Feagin, and Robert Thomas, of Houston: Growth and Decline in a Sunbelt Boomtown (Temple University Press: 1989). My new book, co-edited with Charles Lee (Commission for Racial Justice) and J. Eugene Grigsby (UCLA), is entitled Residential Apartheid: The American Legacy (UCLA Center for Afro-American Studies Publications: 1994). A more complete statement of my professional qualifications is attached as Exhibit 1 to my testimony.
Q. : What is the purpose of your testimony?
A. I have been asked to prepare testimony in support of CANT's Contention J.9. The purpose of my testimony is to discuss my conclusion that the Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") and the Environmental Report ("ER") for the Claiborne Enrichment Center are deficient in their consideration of the environmental justice implications of the proposed CEC. In particular, the EIS and ER are inadequate in the following respects: first, they inaccurately assess the costs and benefits of the proposed CEC; second, they fail to consider the inequitable distribution of costs and benefits of the proposed CEC to white and African-American populations; and third, they fail to consider the fact that the siting of the CEC in a minority community follows a national pattern in which institutionally biased decisionmaking leads to the siting of hazardous facilities in communities of color, and results in the inequitable distribution of costs and benefits to those communities. This pattern has been noted in numerous studies. See United Church of Christ, Commission on Racial Justice, "Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States, a National Report on the Racial and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communities With Hazardous Waste Sites" (UCC: 1987).{1}
Q. : What materials did you review in preparation for your testimony?
A. I reviewed the Environmental Report ("ER") prepared by Louisiana Energy Services in support of its license application; NUREG-1484, the Draft EIS for the Claiborne Enrichment Center (November 1993); and NUREG-1484, the Final EIS ("EIS" or "FEIS") for the Claiborne Enrichment Center (August 1994). In addition, I reviewed the documents obtained by discovery, the depositions of key personnel, available statistical information about the site selection process and its result, and the extensive amount of research and literature available concerning environmental justice. I also reviewed a number of other documents, cited in my testimony, regarding the environmental or public health impacts of the proposed facility. In support of my analysis of the demographics of the candidate region and sites that LES considered, I also consulted with the staff of the Virginia American Civil Liberties Union regarding their evaluation of 1990 Bureau of Census statistical population data. Finally, in December of 1994, I conducted a site visit to the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs.
Q. : What criteria did you apply in your evaluation?
A: A general framework for my analysis was the National Environmental Policy Act, which for major federal actions such as this one, requires that the government consider the environmental impacts and weigh the costs and benefits of the proposed action. These include health and environmental effects, the risk of accidental but foreseeable adverse health and environmental effects, and socioeconomic impacts.
I also considered the developing body of federal policy concerning the consideration of environmental justice in government decisionmaking, including Executive Order 12898, "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations," (February 11, 1994) (Exhibit 2); Draft Environmental Justice Strategy for Executive Order 12898, EPA Pub. No. 200-D-95-001 (January 1995) (Exhibit 3); and NRC Draft Strategic Plan -- Environmental Justice, No. 200-D-95-907 (December 11, 1994) (Exhibit 4).
Finally, I applied well-established criteria and principles that are used by social scientists for analysis of environmental justice and social equity issues.
Q. : What is the current federal guidance on consideration of environmental justice issues in Environmental Impact Statements and other government decisionmaking processes, and how did it evolve?
In June of 1992, EPA issued a report entitled Environmental Equity: Reducing the Risks for All Communities. The report concluded that:
Racial minority and low-income populations experience higher than average exposures to selected air pollutants, hazardous waste facilities, contaminated fish and agricultural pesticides in the workplace. Exposure does not always result in immediate or acute health effects. High exposure, and the possibility of chronic effects, are nevertheless a clear cause of health concerns.
Id. at 3.
In response to these findings and the growing national concerns about environmental justice, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898 on February 11, 1994, "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations," and an accompanying Presidential memorandum, to focus federal attention on environmental and human health and environmental conditions in minority and low-income communities.
The Executive Order sets forth federal agency responsibilities as follows:
Each federal agency shall conduct its programs, policies, and activities that substantially affect human health and the environment, in a manner that ensures that such programs, policies, and activities do not have the effect of excluding persons (including populations) from participation in, denying persons (including populations) the benefits of, or subjecting persons (including populations) to discrimination under, such programs, policies, and activities, because of their race, color, or national origin.
Executive Order 12898, Sec. 2-2.
The U.S. EPA was given the lead in coordinating activities under Executive Order 12898 and an Interagency Working Group ("IWG") was created to draft environmental justice strategic plans. EPA Administrator Carol Browner noted her introductory statement to EPA's Draft Environmental Justice Strategy for Executive Order 12898 that "toxic waste sites inhibit economic growth in thousands of communities."{2} The Administrator went on to state:
Our goal is to ensure that:
No segment of the population, regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, as result of EPA's policies, programs, and activities, suffers disproportionately from adverse health or environmental effects, and all people live in clean and sustainable communities.
Those who must live with environmental decisions --- community residents, environmental groups, State, Tribal and local governments, business --- must have every opportunity for public participation in the making of these decisions. An informed and involved local community is a necessary and integral part of the process to protect the environment.{3}
EPA's working definition of environmental justice is the "fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people, regardless of race, ethnicity, culture, income or educational level with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws."{4} With respect to environmental impact statements, EPA's draft policy states that "EPA reviewers will focus on the spatial distribution of human health, social, and economic effects to ensure that agency decisionmakers are aware of the extent to which those impacts fall disproportionately on low-income and minority communities."
On December 11, 1994, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") issued its draft Environmental Justice Implementation Plan.{5} In the plan, the NRC adopted the EPA's working definition of environmental justice, and acknowledged that the President's executive order on environmental justice and the accompanying memorandum apply to the NRC's "efforts to fulfill the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") as an integral part of NRC's licensing process."{6} The NRC further noted that the executive order is a reminder "to consider, when environmental impact statements and other environmental documents are prepared, the effects of Federal actions on minority and low-income communities."{7} In this regard, the NRC observed that "the key factor for environmental justice is assessing to whom the benefits, and the costs, will accrue i.e. . . . evaluating the extent to which the minority or low-income communities will receive a share of the economic benefits of a project and the extent to which they are specifically impacted by a proposed project."{8}
Q. : Please describe the criteria and principles, referred to above, that are used by social scientists for analysis of environmental justice issues.
Let me begin by describing the problem of environmental inequity, which the concept of environmental justice seeks to redress. In the real world, all people, communities and regions are not created equal. Some communities and interests are more equal than others. Unincorporated communities of color are vulnerable to a "triple jeopardy" in that they are often rural, poor, and politically powerless against industrial interests. Unequal interests and power arrangements have allowed poisons of the rich to be offered as short-term remedies for poverty of the poor. This scenario plays out in the United States, where low income and people of color communities are disproportionately impacted by the location of waste facilities and "risky" technologies. In the United States, race has been found to be independent of class in the location of municipal landfills and incinerators,{9} abandoned toxic waste dumps,{10} and cleanup of Superfund sites.{11}
Recognition of these environmental inequities, while receiving more public attention in the past two years, is not new. The correlation of solid waste siting and the African American community was well documented and described in Houston, Texas in 1983;{12} the United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") reviewed the correlation between hazardous waste landfills and racial and economic status of the surrounding communities in 1983;{13} and the United Church of Christ completed a major study of commercial waste facility location and community makeup in 1987.{14} Each of these studies identified race as a factor in environmentally risky waste disposal siting. Since this period, numerous studies over the years have indicated that some Americans have borne a disproportionate share of pollution burdens.{15}
The framework for evaluating environmental equity consists of three different aspects: geographic, procedural and social equity.
Geographic equity refers to the location and spatial configuration of communities and their proximity to environmental hazards, noxious facilities, and locally unwanted land uses such as landfills, incinerators, sewage treatment plants, lead smelters, refineries, and facilities handling or disposing of radioactive materials. In part because of their geographic and spatial configuration, some communities (i.e., rural areas, sparsely populated areas, people of color communities, Native American reservations, the Southern United States, third world nations, etc.) are more vulnerable to environmental risks than others.{16}
Procedural equity refers to the "fairness" question: the extent to which governing rules, regulations, evaluation and selection criteria, and enforcement are applied uniformly and in a nondiscriminatory way. Procedural "inequities" might involve nonscientific, undemocratic, or arbitrary decision making, exclusionary practices, or nonrepresentativeness of samples, subjects and opinion leaders selected in community rating and site selection scoring systems. Procedural equity also subsumes the question of reliability and validity of the way in which data are collected and analyzed in support of a decision. Procedural inequities in the decisionmaking process serve to perpetuate institutionalized bias and discrimination that result in the disproportionate siting of hazardous facilities in nonwhite and low-income communities.
In short, and as history has demonstrated, if a site selection process which entails the consideration of socioeconomic impacts is not procedurally equitable, then the ultimate assessment of the potential impacts of a proposed facility cannot be characterized as fair and equitable. For example, if impacts are to be assessed through contacts with community leaders, but the process for identifying such leaders is inequitable -- i.e., the leaders consulted are not, in fact, from the affected community -- then the assessment of the impacts cannot be considered fair or equitable.
Social equity refers to the role of sociological factors (race, ethnicity, class, culture, life styles, political power, organization, legal incorporation, etc.) on environmental decision making. Poor people and people of color often work in the most dangerous jobs, live in the most polluted neighborhoods, and their children are exposed to all kinds of environmental toxins on the playgrounds.{17} This is generally the result of their lack of political and economic power in the governmental and economic structures of the larger communities in which they live.
All of the aspects of environmental equity described above are relevant to the evaluation of the NRC's EIS for the Claiborne Enrichment Center.
Q. :How should environmental justice issues be evaluated in an EIS or an environmental report?
As discussed above, for federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, NEPA requires the federal government to evaluate the potential adverse impacts of the proposed action. This evaluation must include an assessment of the health and environmental consequences and risks, as well as economic and sociological impacts. Under the concept of environmental justice, as well as ordinary sociological principles used in impact analysis, impacts on the human environment cannot be understood adequately without reference to the characteristics of the human population that is being affected. For instance, the adverse impacts of a hazardous facility on a community that already has a low income level, little mobility, poor health care, and inadequate community services, will be relatively more severe than for a more wealthy, mobile, and resilient community. Similarly, these communities may not enjoy the benefits of the proposed action to the same level as others do. Thus, any NEPA analysis must inquire into the racial, economic, and educational demographics of the affected population.
It is also important to examine whether site selection criteria which are designed to avoid or mitigate undue adverse impacts are devised and applied in a manner that is uniform, consistent, and not institutionally biased. For example, the LES siting criteria include the desirability of siting the facility at least five miles from institutions such as schools, hospitals, and nursing homes.{18} By its own terms, this criterion is inherently biased toward selection of sites in minority and poor areas, because these areas generally lack institutions such as schools, hospitals, and nursing homes.{19} For instance, there is no school, no hospital or medical facility of any kind, or any other service institution in Forest Grove or Center Springs, even though these communities are five miles distant from the nearest town. While it is not necessarily inappropriate to attempt to site a hazardous facility in an area that is far from institutions, this criterion cannot be applied equitably unless the process is enlightened by consideration of the demographics of the affected population. Otherwise, disadvantaged populations will invariably be favored as hosts for these hazardous facilities.
Application of these criteria must also be consistent and equitable. Thus, for example, if potential host communities are given a role in determining site selection and thereby managing or minimizing the impacts and benefits to their residents, then the actual host communities must be identified and consulted. In this case, LES heavily relied for its siting decision on the opinions of Homer, a community five miles from the actual host community. Homer stood to minimize the risks and maximize the benefit to itself by placing the facility at a certain distance from its own residents. The actual host communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs were never informed of the siting decision until it was too late to have an effect on the process.
Moreover, the license applicant's and the government's decisionmaking process should be examined for objectivity and fairness toward all racial and economic groups that are potentially impacted by the proposed action. Assessments of the potential impacts of a proposed action on health and the environment should not be tainted by discriminatory value judgments.
Q. : How did you apply the guidelines and criteria described above in evaluating the Environmental Report and the EIS against CANT's Contention J.9?
Contention J.9 essentially charges that the EIS failed to consider the disparate environmental impacts of the proposed Claiborne Enrichment Center on the rural black communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs, which lie adjacent to the site of the proposed uranium enrichment plant. Moreover, the contention charges that the proposed siting of the plant in these communities follows a national pattern, in which race consistently has been the single most important factor in the siting of hazardous waste facilities, with the result that the average minority population in communities with hazardous waste facilities is twice as high as the average in communities without such facilities.
In my analysis of these issues, I evaluated the nature of the benefits and adverse impacts of the Claiborne Enrichment Center, and the manner in which those benefits and adverse impacts would fall on the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs. This included an examination of the geographic distribution of the benefits and adverse impacts. As I will discuss further below, I found that there was a disparate allocation of costs and benefits as they pertain to the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs, which was not considered in the EIS.
I then examined the process by which the site was selected to determine whether the disproportionate allocation of costs and benefits in this case was the result of an objective, valid, and reliable decisionmaking process, or whether the process was biased in favor of siting the facility in a poor and underrepresented minority community. This evaluation included consideration of procedural and social equity factors, such as whether the affected communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs were among the communities that were recognized or consulted in the decisonmaking process.
Finally, I examined the EIS and the Environmental Report ("ER") for the Claiborne Enrichment Center, to determine whether they reflected adequate consideration of the disproportionate impacts of the proposed plant on the neighboring communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs, and whether they adequately evaluated the objectivity and reliability of the site selection process in assessing, avoiding, and mitigating adverse impacts.
Q. :Please describe the NRC's evaluation of the disparity in costs and benefits of the proposed Claiborne Enrichment Center as they pertain to the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs.
The Draft EIS for the Claiborne Enrichment Center contained no discussion at all of environmental justice issues, such as the inequitable distribution of costs and benefits, and did not even recognize the existence of Forest Grove and Center Springs. In response to strong public criticism during the comment period, the NRC included in the Final EIS a new section entitled "Environmental Justice."{20} In that section, which amounts to approximately one page of the EIS, the NRC recognizes the need to assess whether "minority and economically disadvantaged populations [will] be disproportionately affected by the CEC." EIS at 4.34. It then provides an extremely brief discussion which concludes, without setting forth any significant supporting analysis, that the proposed plant imposes virtually no disproportionate impacts, and that the benefits are widely distributed.
The EIS correctly acknowledges that: "to the extent that the CEC affects the environment, those living closest will be most affected."{21} However, the EIS asserts that there will be no "significant offsite adverse impacts" as a result of construction and operation of the Claiborne Enrichment Center, because "all aspects" of the facility's operation will be required to comply with state and federal environmental regulations.{22} In addition, all effluent releases "would be below established limits and doses are expected to be well within the regulatory limits."{23} In fact, the only disparate adverse impact on Forest Grove and Center Springs that is acknowledged in Section 4.2.1.7.4 of the EIS is the mere "inconvenience" caused by relocation of the parish road between the two communities, which would add 0.38 miles to the driving distance between them.{24}
Accordingly, the staff concludes that "the impacts associated with the CEC will be relatively small," and that "there will not be a disproportionate adverse impact on minority or low-income populations."{25} On the other hand, Section 4.2.1.7.4 reports that "the CEC will bring substantial employment and economic benefits which will benefit the entire population."{26}
In "summary," the EIS concludes that the proposed plant "is not an example of environmental injustice," because the staff "does not believe that facility operation will result in significantly disproportionate adverse impacts."{27} It should be noted that this conclusion is not supported by citation to a single article, monograph, technical report, or book on environmental justice in the reference section of the Final EIS.
Q. :Please describe your evaluation of the EIS's discussion of the disparity in costs and benefits of the proposed Claiborne Enrichment Center as they pertain to the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs.
First, in order to understand the disparity in costs and benefits as they would fall on the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs, it is necessary to understand the nature and characteristics of these communities. Even before the Claiborne Enrichment Center was sited in Forest Grove and Center Springs, these communities exemplified what I have referred to above as "geographic" and "social" inequity. Both communities are isolated, unincorporated rural enclaves that are geographically separated from the rest of Claiborne Parish.
Forest Grove, founded by freed slaves at the close of the Civil War, has a population of about 150. Center Springs, founded around the turn of the century, has a population of about 100. The population of Forest Grove and Center Springs is about 97% African American.{28} Many of the residents of these two communities are descendants of the original settlers, and a large portion of the landholdings have remained in the same families since their founding.
The residents of Forest Grove and Center Springs are isolated by race and poverty from the rest of the parish. From kindergarten through high school, the children attend racially segregated schools. There are no stores, schools, medical clinics, or businesses in Forest Grove and Center Springs. Parish services to Forest Grove and Center Springs are notably poorer than to other parts of the parish. Aside from Parish Road 39, the roads in Forest Grove and Center Springs generally are either unpaved or poorly maintained. Many residents are not connected to the public water supply, but instead rely on groundwater wells.{29} Some must actually carry their water because they have no potable water supply.
While Forest Grove and Center Springs have a representative on the Claiborne Parish Police Jury, the membership of the police jury is dominated by white members, in a ratio of 8 to 2. Forest Grove and Center Springs residents are not represented on the Claiborne Parish Industrial Development Foundation, the local business organization which promoted the selection of "Homer" as the "host community" for the Claiborne Enrichment Center. Moreover, although the EIS represents the Forest Grove/Center Springs site as the "Homer" site, these communities are outside the boundaries of the town of Homer, and thus are not represented in the government of Homer.
Although there are no specific statistics on income and education level for the residents of Forest Grove and Center Springs, U.S. Census Bureau statistics show that they are part of a population that is among the poorest and most disadvantaged in the United States. Claiborne Parish is one of the poorest regions of the United States. Over 30% of the population for which the poverty level has been determined lives below the poverty level.{30} The differences between the levels of poverty in the white and black populations is also dramatic: over 58% of the black population for which the poverty level has been determined has an income level that is below the poverty line, while less than 11% of whites in that parish are so affected.{31} Per capita income for the black population in Claiborne Parish is only 36% of the per capita income of the white population.{32} In contrast, on a national level African Americans earn 55% of what whites earn.{33} Over 69% of the black population in Claiborne Parish report annual incomes of less than $15,000.{34} Over 50% earn less than $10,000, and over 30% earn less than $5,000.{35} In contrast, among whites in Claiborne Parish, 21.5% earn less than $10,000, and 6.5% earn less than $5,000.{36}
Thirty-one percent of the African American population in Claiborne Parish does not own a car; 42% live in households where the rent is less than $200; over 10% lack complete plumbing.{37} Over 50% of the black households in Claiborne Parish have only one parent, and 58% of the black population has less than a high school education.{38} Among the black population over 24 years old, almost 33% have not attained a 9th grade education.{39}
The communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs lie extremely close to the site of the proposed plant. The Forest Grove Church, which is centrally located in the community, lies about
1 mile south of the location for the proposed plant, and about 3/4 mile from the boundary of the site. The Forest Grove residence nearest to the proposed uranium plant lies about 1/8 of a mile from the plant site. The Center Springs Church, which is also centrally located in the community, lies about 1/2 mile from the site of the proposed uranium plant, and about 1/4 mile from the site boundary. The nearest Center Springs residence lies about two city blocks from the plant site. The two communities are about one and three quarter miles apart.{40}
The EIS' discussion of the adverse impacts of the facility on the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs is seriously deficient. First, the EIS fails to take into account the social and economic characteristics of the affected communities in evaluating the impacts of the proposed plant on the human environment. The EIS also fails to address whether those social and economic characteristics make that population particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts posed by the proposed project. Although the EIS does discuss some of the racial, economic and educational disparities in Claiborne Parish in its evaluation of the economic benefits of jobs, it never relates these disparities to the issue of environmental justice. Moreover, for purposes of assessing socioeconomic impacts, the EIS wrongly "emphasizes" the impacts on the relatively distant towns of Homer and Haynesville, rather than assessing the impacts on the two communities located less than a mile from the site.{41}
Second, many negative impacts would disproportionately affect the Forest Grove and Center Springs communities, but they are not acknowledged at all in the EIS' section on Environmental Justice. These unacknowledged impacts include direct physical impacts, as well as indirect impacts, such as the lowering of property values around the site, undermining of community solidarity, destruction of the amenities of the rural lifestyle which Forest Grove and Center Springs residents have chosen, and imposition of psychological stress on the residents of Forest Grove and Center Springs.
Third, to the extent that the disproportionate adverse impacts on Forest Grove and Center Springs are acknowledged at all in some other parts of the EIS, their significance is improperly minimized or ignored.
Finally, the EIS fails to evaluate the disproportionately low allocation of benefits of the proposed plant to the poor and African American communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs.
The following examples illustrate these serious deficiencies in the EIS:
a. Disproportionate distribution of negative impacts and costs
Many impacts that are identified elsewhere in the EIS would have a disparate effect on the Forest Grove and Center Springs communities, but they are not discussed at all in the EIS' section on Environmental Justice. Moreover, to the extent that some of these disproportionate adverse impacts are acknowledged, their significance is improperly minimized. In other cases, the staff recognizes that there is a risk of adverse impacts, but fails to discuss the consequences of those impacts to the neighbors of the plant because it believes the likelihood that they will occur is small. This is not a valid analytical process, because it fails to recognize the facts that (a) the Claiborne Enrichment Center is a hazardous facility, with a certain level of risk that cannot be eliminated through regulation, (b) whether intentional or not, licensees don't always comply with the safety and environmental regulations that are intended to protect the public; and (c) the neighbors of the plant bear a disproportionately high risk of experiencing the adverse effects caused by accidents or contamination. They are on the front line of airborne releases and waterborne contamination from the plant. Even where the likelihood of such accidents and contamination may be small, it is not so small as to be unforeseeable; and the consequences to the neighbors of the plant are potentially very grave.
i. Accidents
In Section 4.2.2.77 of the EIS, the NRC staff analyzes potential accidents at the Claiborne Enrichment Center site. The EIS identifies the "greatest hazard" associated with operation of the plant as a UF6 storage area fire.{42} In such an accident, uranium intakes in excess of the NRC limit of 10 milligrams (mg) "are predicted for considerable distances" from the plant stacks.{43} The EIS predicts doses of 110 mg at 500 meters, 92 mg at 1,000 meters, 44 mg at 2,000 meters, 11 mg at 5,000 meters, and 3 mg at 10,000 meters.{44} The EIS postulates that the nearest resident to the north is approximately 800 meters from the stacks, and that this resident is the "maximally exposed" individual for purposes of calculating airborne releases.{45} The nearest residence in Center Springs lies only a few blocks from the stacks, and the Center Springs Church lies about 400 meters north of the stacks. Accordingly, residents of Center Springs are especially vulnerable to toxic accidental airborne releases from the plant.{46}
The EIS provides no discussion of the effects of such accidental releases on the nearby population, other than to say that "[t]he potential consequences of this type of accident are unacceptable."{47} The EIS' failure to discuss the potential consequences of this accident in any detail appears to be based on the existence of various measures that are designed to prevent such an accident from occurring.{48} However, as discussed above, this is not a valid basis for failing to discuss the potential adverse impacts of severe accidents on Forest Grove and Center Springs, the closest communities to the site. These communities bear a foreseeable risk of such an accident, and that risk is significantly higher than the risk borne by people living farther away. The NRC has recognized that airborne uranium hexafluoride releases are fast-moving, thus leaving close neighbors of the site little or no time to evacuate, or even shelter.{49} A UF6 fire is likely to occur "with little warning."{50} Furthermore,
Releases from a fire could start even before the fire is detected or shortly thereafter. Plume travel time to nearby people is likely to be no more than a few minutes. Releases would usually end when the local fire department has controlled the fire, generally within half an hour to an hour. Releases of UF6 are likely to start without warning and be of short duration. . . . . As a result, protective actions would usually have to be taken very quickly to be effective.{51}
It appears that in this case, the risk to the plant neighbors from a UF6 storage area fire is further exacerbated by the fact that LES' Emergency Plan has given the Claiborne Parish Fire Department significant responsibilities for extinguishing such a fire, without providing clear instructions to the offsite fire fighters.{52}
These disproportionate accident risks to the adjacent communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs should have been analyzed in the EIS, but were not.
ii. Contamination of surface and groundwater
With respect to the potential for contamination caused by operation of the Claiborne Enrichment Center, the EIS concedes that there is a risk of groundwater and soil contamination during construction and operation.
The EIS reports that during site preparation and construction, the potential exists for fuel or oil spills from heavy construction equipment and onsite storage of fuels.{53} "If the volume of a fuel or oil spill is large enough, or if a spill occurs in close proximity to local surface water, it may migrate and contaminate groundwater or surface water."{54} The NRC expects that the potential construction-related impacts on groundwater "can be prevented, contained, and mitigated."{55}; nevertheless, construction activities do pose an acknowledged risk of such contamination, which clearly would affect the immediate neighbors of the facility rather than people who live farther away from the site.
The operation of the facility also poses risks to the quality of the groundwater in the surrounding area:
The operation of the CEC facility creates the potential for releases of chemicals to surface water and groundwater. The sources of these potential contaminant releases are the discharge of treated wastewater and facility surface water runoff; the handling and storage of fuel, oil, and other hazardous chemicals; and the deposition of airborne contaminants.
Water that is used by the facility for normal operation (i.e., sanitation, laundry, equipment cleaning, etc.) will be treated before discharge by the facility sewage treatment system. Treated wastewater will be discharged through an approved National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) and LDEQ Wastewater Discharge Permit outfall (LES, 1992e). CEC is expected to comply with the requirements of these permits. The potential exists for this discharged water to become contaminated with hazardous substances released during the operation of the site. Surface water runoff from precipitation events will drain from the tails storage area and other portions of the site and will be discharged to the Hold-Up Basin.{56}
Elsewhere, the NRC has also stated that contamination of the soil and holding pond on the site must be anticipated, "[b]ased on NRC experience at other licensed facilities."{57}
Thus, the EIS acknowledges the potential that ground and surface water will be contaminated as a result of the Claiborne Enrichment Center's operation. Clearly, the residents of Forest Grove and Center Springs, who live closest to the site, would bear the greatest burden of the health and environmental impacts caused by such contamination. As discussed above, many of these residents rely on groundwater wells for their drinking water supply. In addition, as is common among low-income people who live in rural areas, many Forest Grove and Center Springs residents rely for a significant part of their food supply on fish and game that are present in the area of the site.{58} Thus, they would be disproportionately affected by contamination of fish and game. In addition, many of the residents plant vegetables to subsidize their food budgets. Clearly, as acknowledged in the FEIS, the contamination of the environment on whose fruits local residents subsist is a foreseeable consequence of the operation of the Claiborne Enrichment Center. Indeed, this has been the unfortunate fate of many nuclear facilities of many types over past years. Yet, the EIS fails entirely to address the disproportionate nature of these potential impacts.
The EIS also states that the waste product, or "tails" from the production of enriched uranium, will be stored outdoors at the site for as long as 15 years on the site.{59} Based on the testimony of Arjun Makhijani in this case, regarding the difficulties associated with disposal of this waste, LES may be unable to find a disposal site for the tails. As a result the plant site may become a long-term storage site for the tails. As Dr. Makhijani has testified, such long-term storage poses risks of deterioration of the storage canisters. LES has no contingency plan for long-term onsite storage of the depleted uranium tails. Thus, there is also a reasonable basis for concern that the groundwater may become contaminated by leaking storage canisters.
iii. Impacts on groundwater supply
According to the EIS, the operation of the Claiborne Enrichment Center "creates the potential for nonradiological environmental impacts to the site hydrology."{60} These impacts "include changes in the amount and flow direction of surface water" and "changes in the elevation and flow direction of groundwater."{61} The FEIS also reports that "[t]he operation of the facility may result in changes in the elevation of the shallow and deep aquifers beneath the site. These changes will be caused by both a combination of decreased groundwater recharge beneath facility buildings, storage yards, and parking lots and by the withdrawal of groundwater for use by the CEC facility."{62} The EIS concludes that although the shallow water table will be lowered, this effect "should not be observed beyond the site boundaries and will not adversely impact domestic production in offsite wells."{63} Similarly, it concludes that although the deeper aquifer, the Sparta Sand Aquifer, will also "experience a decrease in elevation" as a result of pumping, this "will not have a significant adverse impact on local water supply and wells."{64} Although this language minimizes the significance of or potential for offsite adverse impacts, it does not rule them out. Thus, the clearly disproportionate impact of these risks on the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs should have been considered.
iv. Noise
With respect to noise impacts, the EIS states that construction of the facility "will require the use of large earth-moving equipment, compressors, and generators. Additionally, increased truck and light vehicle traffic flow on roads and highways in the area will result in increased noise."{65} This noise may be "loud and annoying." Road construction and "other short-term construction activities nearer to the residence" [sic] will also create noticeably higher noise levels for a shorter period of time.{66} Construction is predicted to last approximately six years.{67}
According to the EIS, increased traffic by automobiles, trucks and heavy equipment, moving to and from the facility, will also increase noise levels during operation of the facility.{68} The discussion of noise is extremely contradictory. The EIS first states that the noise "will be greater than existing conditions but not noticeably so. The primary difference is that the noise level will be more continuous during the day, with levels during the night equivalent to daytime periods during shift changes."{69} In almost the same breath, the EIS states that noise "should not be increased significantly except along roads around the plant at the time of nighttime shift changes."{70} While this noise level "should not cause hearing damage or be any louder than in the daytime, the noise levels at some residences would be high enough to cause some disturbance of sleep."{71} However, the NRC dismisses the sleep-disturbing level of the noise as something that would bother people for "relatively short periods of time as they adjust to the noise."{72}
Thus, it appears that there will be a constant and significant noise increase for the residences near the road to the facility, and that the noise will be loud enough to wake a sleeping person. Thus, it is a contradiction in terms to brand this an "insignificant" impact. Moreover, this impact clearly falls disproportionately on the people living closest to the plant.
v. Traffic, development, and increased crime
According to the EIS, during the peak period (years 2 through 5) of the approximately six years of construction, an average of 275 construction workers will be employed at any given time, with a maximum average of 400 workers and 145 operations personnel in the fourth year.{73} This represents a total increase of 1,090 car trips per day over the amount of traffic that is currently on the area roads.{74} With the addition of about 86 one-way truck trips per day, the peak traffic counts will increase by 1,176 vehicles per day, resulting in "a substantial increase in the daily traffic flow along road LA9, with traffic increasing from 1,770 to nearly 3,000 vehicles per day."{75} It appears from the EIS that all of these vehicles will exit Route LA9, pass through Center Springs, and enter the site through the north gate.{76}
During full-production operation, about 180 people will be employed as operations staff at the facility.{77} This would result in an increase of about 360 one-way car trips per day. Assuming that 10 to 20 trucks arrive at the plant per day, the number of one-way trips would be 380 to 400.
Although the EIS gives a figure for the level of traffic on road LA9, the main road leading to Center Springs, it does not provide any figures for current levels of traffic in Center Springs. However, based on my own visit there, both Center Springs and Forest Grove are very quiet rural communities, with very little traffic on Parish Road 39, the road which connects them. An increase of over 1,100 one-way vehicle trips per day during construction, and almost 400 vehicle trips per day during operation, would substantially disturb the peaceful and rural setting of Center Springs.
Moreover, as the funnel through which all traffic to and from the plant must pass, Center Springs would bear a disproportionate share of the burden of increased traffic in the area. Yet, the EIS does not discuss, or even acknowledge, these disparate impacts on the community of Center Springs.
The EIS also fails to fully address the potential impacts of the closing of Parish Road 39, which runs through the middle of the proposed site. The EIS presumes that the parish road will be relocated after it is closed.{78} However, it is by no means clear that the road will be relocated. As the EIS acknowledges, the decision to relocate the road rests not with LES but the Claiborne Parish Police Jury.{79} Presumably, the responsibility to pay for the road's relocation also rests with the Claiborne Parish Police Jury. Thus, although LES may predict that the road will be relocated, it is entirely foreseeable that the Police Jury will decide to forego the expense of relocating the road. If the road is closed but not relocated, residents of Center Springs would have to travel to Forest Grove (and vice versa) by the main highways, which would take them about 8 to 9 miles out of their way. This disparate adverse impact is not addressed in the EIS.
Moreover, even assuming that the road will indeed be relocated, the NRC's conclusion that the potential impacts of relocating the road are "very small," and "would not impose unacceptable risks to the local community," is off-base.{80} There is no indication that the NRC consulted any of the residents of Forest Grove and Center Springs before concluding that the impacts of road relocation would be "very small." Had LES consulted these residents, it would have found that this road is a vital and frequently used link between the two communities, with regular pedestrian traffic.
The increase in traffic to and from the Claiborne Enrichment Center is certain to spur the development of all-night businesses and fast-food restaurants.{81} According to the EIS, this increase in economic activity "would tend to increase the potential for crime at such businesses."{82} It is foreseeable, if not inevitable, that much of this economic development will occur in the immediate vicinity of the proposed plant.
Moreover, the EIS acknowledges that the local police forces in Homer and Haynesville, which are "strained at present,"{83} are unlikely to be sufficient to accommodate the increase in demand stemming from CEC construction and operation."{84} The EIS predicts that the anticipated necessary additions of two to four officers to the Homer and Haynesville police departments "may or may not be offset by increased tax revenues arising from the CEC facility or associated personnel settling within the Parish."{85} In a separate section of the EIS, the NRC staff reports that LES will get a 10-year "tax abatement" from the state of Louisiana, and is also expected to have a tax loss (and thus would not pay state income tax) through the year 2005.{86} Thus, at least for the first ten years, it does not appear that the Claiborne Enrichment Center will yield sufficient tax revenues to offset the increased costs of law enforcement.
Clearly, the construction and operation of the Claiborne Enrichment Center would bring traffic, development, and crime to Forest Grove and Center Springs, thus raising the safety risks to the population, and harming -- if not destroying -- the peaceful and rural quality of the area. The EIS wrongly fails to acknowledge that these adverse impacts are significant for the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs, and that they would fall disproportionately on Forest Grove and Center Springs, in contrast to the population in the rest of the parish. The disproportionate nature of these adverse impacts is not addressed at all in the EIS.
vi. Depression of real estate values
The EIS acknowledges that "some" property values may be adversely affected by the proposed plant.{87} However, the EIS fails to identify the location, extent, or significance of property value diminution. Instead, the EIS vaguely cites "changes in property values (some positive, some negative)."{88}
My own research has shown that the negative impacts on property values will occur in the immediate area of the plant. In the foreseeable event that the site becomes a long-term nuclear waste storage site, as discussed above, property values will further decline. Moreover, because of the housing barriers facing African Americans, Forest Grove and Center Springs residents will not have the same opportunities to relocate as do whites who live in the parish.{89}
It is also clear that the general beneficial effects of the plant on property values, cited at page 4-83 of the EIS, will have little if any effect on the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs.{90} First, general "benefit streams"{91} to counties with large industrial taxpayers do not have significant positive effects on low-income minority communities who are already receiving a disproportionately low share of the services offered by the county.{92} Second, the increased demand for property and housing by migrants to the area is unlikely to affect Forest Grove and Center Springs very much, if at all. As stated elsewhere in the EIS, during peak construction, when the proposed plant is expected to have its greatest effect on the local population, these migrants will amount to only 12% of the work force or 65 people.{93} Moreover, these workers will be at the "higher" and "very upper" end of the skill and pay scale, and are expected to be predominantly white.{94} These workers are extremely unlikely to seek housing in a poor and isolated African American community which receives a relatively low level of services from the parish.
Thus, the EIS acknowledges that the construction and operation of the proposed uranium enrichment plant will depress some property values, while other property values increase. However, the EIS fails to address the fact that, in all likelihood, the negative impacts will disproportionately affect the immediate neighbors of the plant. The EIS also fails to address the fact that the residents of Forest Grove and Center Springs, who are among the poorest residents of Claiborne Parish, are less likely to be able to sustain the adverse economic impacts of a diminution in their property values than are other, wealthier and more mobile residents of Claiborne Parish. These are inequitable and discriminatory impacts that should have been addressed in the EIS.
b. Disproportionate distribution of benefits
The benefits of the proposed Claiborne Enrichment Center are discussed in Section 4.5 of the EIS. According to the EIS, "Regional benefits are primarily in the form of high-paying construction and operations jobs (averaging $37,000 and $44,000, respectively, including benefits, 1990 dollars).{95} Most of these high-paying jobs will go to "migrants" from outside Claiborne Parish.{96} At the "very upper-end" of the pay scale, (health physicists, chemical engineers, etc.), workers will be "brought in from existing high-technology chemical and nuclear facilities in other parts of the U.S."{97}
According to the EIS, "Operations jobs are likely to be filled by existing residents of the 24-parish labor pool, particularly at the lower-end of the skill and pay scale."{98} However, even among this group, the labor pool is "highly stratified."{99} As the EIS reports,
Of the adult (age 16 and over) population in the narrowly defined seven-county LES employment region (as defined by LES, 1994a), more than 30 percent are not high school graduates. In Claiborne Parish, non-high school graduates represent almost 47 percent of the population ages 16 and older. In both cases, the rates are disproportionately higher for blacks than whites. Most of the employed individuals of both races work in lower skill, lower wage jobs. The likelihood of job training and operations employment will be concentrated among a group of currently more qualified and more educated individuals. These individuals are statistically more likely to be white than black. Lesser qualified individuals in the area will obtain jobs in the cafeteria, administration, general plant maintenance, and support services areas.{100}
The FEIS asserts that "experience, training, and initiative" will provide lower-paid workers with "the opportunity to advance and earn higher wages."{101} However, this assertion is unsupported by reference to any training or advancement program sponsored by LES.
As discussed above, the EIS also claims that property values in the area of the plant will generally increase. However, any increase in property values caused by the proposed plant is likely to occur in white, middle class neighborhoods, and not in the poor, African American communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs.
Thus, it is clear that the benefits of the proposed Claiborne Enrichment Center will accrue disproportionately to whites who live outside Claiborne Parish. Because of their education level and lack of skills, residents of Forest Grove and Center Springs, along with other African American residents of Claiborne Parish, may not even qualify for the lowest paying jobs at the plant. Yet, LES is proposing that they should bear the brunt of the plant's risks and adverse impacts.
Q. :Please describe your evaluation of whether the disproportionate allocation of costs and benefits in this case was the result of an objective, valid, and reliable decisionmaking process
In my opinion, the process for selecting the Forest Grove/Center Springs site for the Claiborne Enrichment Center was biased, inconsistent, irrational, and unsupported, and therefore was invalid.
Q. :Please describe the process by which LES claims to have selected the site for the Claiborne Enrichment Center, as reflected in the EIS.
As described in the EIS, "LES followed a three-phased screening process to identify a suitable site for the CEC."{102} For each phase, "LES used a set of economic, technical, social, and environmental criteria" to assess candidate communities and potential sites.{103} According to the EIS, the first phase involved identification of candidate regions; the second phase identified potential areas, and the third phase identified alternative locations and sites.{104}
In Section 7.1, the ER describes the process in more detail: First, in a "coarse screening" stage, LES examined the entire United States against a certain set of criteria, and narrowed the field to northern Louisiana.{105} Next, in the first phase of the "Intermediate Screening" stage, LES solicited 21 communities in northern Louisiana and asked them to nominate candidate sites, based on another set of criteria.{106} In the second phase of the Intermediate screening stage, nine "final candidate communities" were selected from the 21 communities, using yet another set of criteria.{107} During this phase and later phases, LES used the well-known "Kepner-Tregoe method of comparing alternatives on the basis of multiple criteria.{108} Under this method, specific listed criteria were analyzed and divided into "musts," which must be satisfied, and "wants," which are deemed desirable. The "wants" were weighted according to their relative importance. Communities and sites were given weighted scores and ranked accord-ing to their scores. The community of Homer ranked highest in this process.{109}
In the first phase of the "Fine Screening" stage, six sites "around Homer" were scored against eight site selection criteria.{110} This narrowed the field to LeSage, the highest scorer, plus two alternatives: Emerson and the Prison site.{111} In the second phase of "Fine Screening," these three sites were examined against a more refined set of criteria, and the LeSage site was chosen.
Q. :How, if at all, does the EIS address environmental equity in this site selection process?
The EIS does not directly address the question of environmental equity in the site selection process. However, the EIS does state that the "approach used by LES" in selecting the site for the Claiborne Enrichment Center was "reasonable."{112} This assertion is relevant to the question of procedural equity, described in my testimony above. The word "reasonable" carries the implication of objectivity and reliability.
The EIS also claims to have evaluated the question of whether the selection of the proposed CEC site was based on racial considerations.{113} The staff reports that it "found no specific evidence that racial considerations were a factor."{114}
Moreover, LES, on whose Environmental Report the NRC relies for its EIS, did not address environmental equity at all in the site selection process. None of the Fluor Daniel staff responsible for the site selection process claimed any knowledge of environmental justice issues or concepts during the time of the site selection work. They were unaware of the studies produced in Houston, or the findings published by GAO or the United Church of Christ study, supra.{115} Moreover, LES never considered the racial makeup of the site communities in the siting analysis, including the "LeSage" site, the final choice in the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs.{116} Thus, because environmental justice issues were not considered by LES in the siting process, there was no process for minimizing or mitigating disproportionate impacts through the siting decision.
Q. :What is the relevance of reasonableness and discrimination in the site selection process to the adequacy of the EIS' discussion of disproportionate environmental impacts on the Forest Grove and Center Springs communities?
These issues are intertwined in a number of ways. First, the site selection process for the Claiborne Enrichment Center involved consideration of numerous criteria that related to environmental impacts, such as the desirability of choosing a low population zone, and the desirability of avoiding areas with institutions. If consideration of these factors was biased, inconsistent or irrational, then the potential adverse impacts of the facility might not be adequately considered and mitigated. Second, even where siting considerations are not specifically related to environmental impacts, if they are biased, inconsistent, or irrational, they can distort or sway the ultimate decision in a manner adverse to environmental protection. Finally, where, as here, some part of the community has a role in choosing the site for the facility, biased or unreasonable considerations in identifying the sector of the population that should have a say in the process can also improperly affect the ultimate decision regarding the mitigation or minimization of adverse impacts through siting.
Q. :Do you agree with the NRC's finding that racial considerations were not a factor in the site selection process for the CEC?
No. Although evidence of intentional discrimination is rare to find in a case like this, the site selection process for the Claiborne Enrichment Center does show many signs of institutional discrimination. Perhaps one of the most significant indications that institutionalized racism played a part in the site selection process is the fact that at each progressive stage of the site selection process, the level of poverty and percentage of African Americans in the candidate regions and sites increased, culminating in the selection of a site that is extremely poor and over 97% African American.
In addition, as discussed above, racial discrimination was inherent in at least one of the siting criteria related to the human health impacts of the proposed plant: distance from institutions. With respect to another environmental impact-related criterion -- low population -- LES applied this criterion in a biased manner which was improperly influenced by the desire to protect the white middle class lifestyle on Lake Claiborne. The site selection process was also discriminatory in that it defined the term "host community" to exclude the very people who would be most directly affected by the Claiborne Enrichment Center: the poor and black residents of Forest Grove and Center Springs. Finally, extreme inconsistencies and irregularities in the site selection process, as well as LES' failure to adequately document the reasons for its site selection decisions, strongly indicate that the decisionmaking process was not objective or orderly, but was a subjective and ad hoc process in which the consideration of environmental impacts and benefits was tainted by irrational or biased considerations.
As a result of all of these instances of institutionalized racism, a siting decision was made which unjustly imposed a disproportionate burden of costs and negative impacts on a poor African American community, at the same time that it rewarded and protected the surrounding white community. Thus, whether the discrimination was intentional or not, this process violated the principles of NEPA and environmental justice.
Q. :How do the demographic characteristics of the site selection process indicate that the site selection process was inequitable or had discriminatory impacts?
From the very beginning, whether consciously intended or not, the LES siting process focused on areas adversely impacted by poverty and populated by African Americans. In fact, as the site selection proceeded, and the focus of the search narrowed, the level of poverty and minority representation in the population rose dramatically. According to data provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990), the state of Louisiana contains the second highest percentage of poor households in the thirteen southern states (22.8%), barely a percentage point lower than its neighboring state, Mississippi, which has the highest poverty rate (24.7%).{117} Louisiana, with an African American population of 30.8%, is the second highest state in black population as a percent of total population, exceeded only by its neighbor, Mississippi, with 35.6%.{118}
Among the parishes in Northern Louisiana, which was chosen by LES as the "candidate region" for the Claiborne Enrichment Center, the parishes of Claiborne and Bienville have high poverty levels of over 30%. Only a few other Louisiana parishes, adjoining the Mississippi River and due south of Interstate 20, exceed the 30 percent level.{119} The same situation exists for racial makeup. The Northern Louisiana parishes of Claiborne, Bienville, De Soto and Morehouse all have populations of black Americans greater than 41 percent.
When the site selection process narrowed to Claiborne Parish, the level of minority representation and poverty increased significantly. In Claiborne Parish, African Americans comprise 46% of the population.{120} As discussed above in response to Question 10, there is an enormous gap between the poverty level of the white and black populations: over 58% of the black population has an income level that is below the poverty line, while less than 11% of whites in that parish are so affected. Whites also earn more than three times the earnings of African Americans.
Finally, the percentage of African Americans around the LeSage site, where the site selection process ultimately focused, is 97%. As discussed above, the population of the surrounding communities fits the parish profile for economic disadvantages.
This progressive trend, involving the narrowing of the site selection process to areas of increasingly high poverty and African American representation, is also evident from an evaluation of the actual sites that were considered in the Intermediate and Fine Screening stages of the site selection process. At my request, the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia performed an analysis, using census track data, of the percentage of black population within a one mile radius of 78 of the 79 sites that LES claims it seriously considered as candidate sites.{121} The ACLU's analysis shows that the aggregate average percentage of black population for a one mile radius around all of the 78 sites examined (in 16 parishes){122} is 28.35%. When LES completed its initial site cuts, and reduced the list to 37 sites within nine communities (parishes), including Homer, the aggregate percentage of black population rose to 36.78%. When LES then further limited its focus to six sites in Claiborne Parish, the aggregate average percentage black population rose again, to 64.74%. The final site selected, the "LeSage" site, has a 97.1% black population within a one-mile radius.
Q. :Please describe the other evidence of discrimination or procedural inequity that you mentioned above.
a.Criterion of "community support" applied in a biased, irrational, and inequitable manner.
First, one of LES' principal criteria for the site selection was support from the community and opinion leaders in the community. Throughout the entire site selection process, LES "held in consideration" the standard that "[t]he facility should be developed in a locale where it would be considered an asset to the community."{123} Accordingly, at key stages of the site selection process described in the ER and EIS, LES employed criteria that valued public support for the project. For example, in Phase II of the Intermediate Screening stage, when the field had been narrowed to nine communities, "local support" was used as a criterion and was given the highest possible weight of 10 for purposes of scoring the communities according to the Kepner-Tregoe method.{124} In both Phase I and Phase II of the Intermediate Screening stage, "active, cohesive community leadership" was evaluated.{125} In Phase II, this factor was also given the highest possible "want-weight" of 10.{126} At the Fine Screening stage, when LES was choosing among the "Homer" sites, community support was no longer considered because it was deemed to have already been established.{127} However, in choosing among the sites, LES gave a want-weight of 10 to "community leader preferences."{128}
However, these criteria were not applied in a manner that was objective or reliable. Despite the alleged importance of "community support," LES did not even recognize the existence of Forest Grove and Center Springs as communities, let alone consult their leaders regarding community support for the proposed facility. Instead, it defined the "community" as Homer, a town that is five miles away, and whose government contains no representation from Forest Grove or Center Springs. This erroneous definition of the relevant "community" was not only unfairly biased against Forest Grove and Center Springs, the communities most severely affected by the siting decision, but constituted an inconsistent and irrational application of the pivotal criterion of "community support."
LES' concept of community leadership, which was key to its assessment of community support, was also irrational and biased toward the consultation of individuals who had no interest or stake in the welfare of Forest Grove and Center Springs, but rather stood to benefit from imposing the risks of the facility on those communities while they reaped the benefits. During the site selection process, the strength of "community support" was assessed and scored against a weighted criterion through meetings and contacts with community business and elected leaders.{129} In the case of Homer, the group of community leaders that LES met with, and on which it formed its opinion of community support and active and cohesive community leadership, was heavily dominated by the Claiborne Parish Industrial Development Foundation (on which Forest Grove and Center Springs have no representation), and elected officials from the towns of Homer and Haynesville.{130} Thus, the "community" represented by these individuals did not include Forest Grove or Center Springs. Moreover, unlike Forest Grove and Center Springs, this "community" stood to benefit from the facility without incurring any of its environmental risks. This was not a valid or equitable basis for LES' assessment of community support for the siting of the plant in Forest Grove and Center Springs.
During the Intermediate Screening stage of the site selection process, when "community support" was a critical consideration, LES made no deliberate effort to meet with the one elected official who might have represented the views of Forest Grove and Center Springs: their representative on the Claiborne Parish Police Jury.{131} In fact, LES did not meet with the then-representative to the Claiborne Parish Police Jury until after the community of Homer had been chosen as the "host community."{132} At that point, as discussed above, community support was no longer a factor in the decisionmaking process. The only community-related criterion that remained was "community leader preference" regarding the location of the site. Even at this stage, LES evaluated community leader preference for the location of the plant according to the opinions of the same group of Homer and Haynesville-dominated business and elected leaders that LES had relied on to gauge "community support" for the proposed plant.{133} These community leaders did not include the Forest Grove/Center Springs representative to the Police Jury, or any other representatives or residents of Forest Grove or Center Springs.
In my opinion, this portion of the site selection process for the Claiborne Enrichment Center demonstrates a classic example of procedural inequity. Although LES claimed to hold "local support" and "community preferences" in high regard, in fact it never considered the views of the community that would actually host the proposed facility and that would be directly and adversely affected by its construction and operation. Instead, LES based its analysis on the preferences of a different community, which would not be directly affected by the risks and impacts of the facility but which stood to benefit from it. Thus, a facially neutral site selection process was perverted to give certain communities the discretion to decide who should accept the adverse environmental impacts of the proposed facility. This perverted process allowed these certain communities to reap the benefits of the facility, while foisting the adverse impacts on other communities that had no voice in the process. As a result, the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs were burdened with the disproportionate adverse impacts of the proposed uranium plant, without the benefit of an objective analysis of the environmental impacts on them or the appropriateness of imposing those impacts on their community in place of any other.
b.Consideration of low population criterion was biased and inequitable.
Because of the hazardous nature of the operation of the proposed Claiborne Enrichment Center, the site selection criteria included several criteria that clearly were designed to minimize the adverse impacts of the plant to public health. In Phase I of the Fine Screening Stage, when LES was considering the six "Homer" sites, one of these criteria was "Low Adjacent Population."{134} LES stated that a low population density within a two-mile radius of the facility was "desirable, and gave this criterion a "want-weight" of 8 out of a possible weight of ten.{135} In my evaluation of the site selection process, I found that this important criteria, which is designed to mitigate adverse health impacts and risks to the public, was applied in a sloppy, irrational and discriminatory manner.
According to Larry Engwall, a Fluor-Daniel employee who was the principal person responsible for the site selection process at this stage, he evaluated and scored the six sites' satisfaction of the "low population" criterion based on an "eyeball assessment."{136} This assessment consisted of a drive along the main road through Forest Grove, in which Mr. Engwall saw "a small cluster of houses" and some "boarded up houses." "Every now and then" he would drive up dirt roads. Based on this, Mr. Engwall guessed that there were "maybe ten people living there at most."{137} It does not appear that Mr. Engwall drove through Center Springs at all.
In fact, there are about 150 people living in Forest Grove, and 100 in Center Springs. Had Mr. Engwall taken the most basic measures that are typically used to assess population levels, such as consulting aerial photographs or county land records, or had he talked to anyone living in Forest Grove, he would have gotten more accurate information, and not rendered this African American population invisible. He also would not have taken the condition of the housing as empirical evidence of the number of people living there. However, based on his cursory and biased examination of Forest Grove, Mr. Engwall gave the LeSage site a score of 9, out of a maximum score of 10.{138} When multiplied by the "want-weight of 8, this yielded a weighted score of 72.
Mr. Engwall also used invalid and biased considerations when comparing the population level of the LeSage site to that of the Emerson site, the closest contender in Phase I of the Final Screening stage. The Emerson site was given a score of 7, yielding a significantly lower weighted score of 56. This score was based on Mr. Engwall's observation that there were between 50 and 100 people living there.{139} When asked what caused him to give the Emerson site a score of 7, Mr. Engwall responded, "[p]robably the proximity to the lake" [Lake Claiborne].{140}
It appears that the quality of life in the white, middle class lakeside community near the Emerson site improperly affected Mr. Engwall's scoring of the "low population" criterion for Emerson.{141} Earlier in his deposition, Mr. Engwall had testified that the Emerson site was rated "neutral to slightly negative" because it was "right on the edge of the lake. This lake is a very nice lake. This lake is the pride and joy of this part of Louisiana, nice boating, nice homes along the lake."{142} He added that "it was felt that an industrial facility this close to that lake would not be in keeping with the existing usage, which was nice homes, vacation and fishing, hunting."{143}
It is clear that these quality of life considerations affected LES' scoring of the Emerson site. It is also clear that such considerations should not have influenced Mr. Engwall's scoring of the population level there. However, at this stage of the site selection process, low population was the only
criterion whose scoring could have been affected by Mr. Engwall's subjective and biased judgments. In Phase I of the Fine Screening stage, where this evaluation took place, there was no site-specific criterion related to quality of life, because satisfaction of the quality of life criterion had previously been judged based on community characteristics, not characteristics of individual sites.{144} Nor did quality of life considerations affect the score for the criterion of "community leader preference," because community leaders liked the Emerson site as well as they liked LeSage, and thus the two sites had the same weighted score.{145} Nevertheless, Mr. Engwall himself felt that "opinion-wise people would not want this plant to be close to their pride and joy of their lake where they go fishing."{146} Since LES did not score Emerson lower than LeSage with respect to the "community leader preference" criterion, and since the rest of the criteria listed for this stage of the site selection process -- low flood risk, good state highway access, institutions within 5 miles, total land price, site shape, topography -- are both highly objective and irrelevant to the quality of life by the lake, it appears that Mr. Engwall's biased judgment regarding the desirability of avoiding the lakeside site, where white middle class people happened to live, was the basis for the relative scoring of the "low population" criterion.
The factoring of quality of life considerations into LES' evaluation of the low population criterion was both irrational and discriminatory against the Forest Grove and Center Springs communities, whose lifestyle and socioeconomic status were on a much lower plane. They taint the entire site selection process, and indicate that LES was more concerned about preserving the amenities of the white middle class lifestyle on Lake Claiborne than about minimizing the environmental impacts of the Claiborne Enrichment Center to the adjacent population, which is poor and African American.
b. Significant irregularities, gaps and inconsistencies in the documentation of the site selection process fatally undermines the reliability and validity of the process as a means for minimizing or mitigating impacts.
The ER and the EIS give the unmistakable impression that the selection of the location for the CEC was carried out by an orderly and systematic process. As described in these documents and as set forth above, the selection proceeded through five sequential and specific stages, each stage involving the judgment of a candidate region or set of candidate sites and communities against a well-defined set of criteria. According to these documents, Homer was one of twenty-one communities evaluated at Phase 1 of the intermediate screening, and one of nine communities later considered in Phase 2 of the Intermediate Screening stage through use of the Kepner-Tregoe methodology. As a result of the analysis conducted at these two phases, Homer was selected as the community in which the CEC facility would be located.{147} According to the ER and EIS, six locations within Homer were analyzed during Phase 1 of the Fine Screening, including the LeSage site, and then three locations within Homer were further considered during Phase 2 of the Fine Screening, resulting in the ultimate selection of the LeSage site for the facility.{148}
However, the underlying site selection documents provided to CANT in discovery tell a different story and raise serious questions about the validity and integrity of the site selection process. In particular, the record shows that the community of Homer was treated differently than any other community considered in the site selection process. This preferential treatment of Homer appears to have begun at one of the earliest stages of the site selection process, Phase I of the Intermediate Screening stage. In this phase, according to the ER, consideration of a set of specific criteria, during "visits to each of the communities," reduced to nine "the number of candidate communities for further consideration."{149}
While the first phase of the Intermediate screening process was begun in the spring and completed in the summer of 1988{150}, there is not a single contemporaneous document in the site selection files that shows that Homer was actually considered as a potential host community at that time. Homer also does not appear on the one purportedly comprehensive listing of communities and sites considered during the intermediate phase of the site screening: the list of 58 sites provided to CANT in discovery.{151} Indeed, William Schaperkotter, a Fluor-Daniel employee responsible for this stage of the site selection, admitted that Homer failed to nominate a single site during this process.{152} Nor did LES representatives visit Homer, as they did every other community that was under consideration at this stage.{153} Thus, although the nomination and evaluation of potential sites and a visit to the nominating community are presented in the ER as prerequisites for consideration beyond Phase I of the Intermediate Screening stage, Homer -- which satisfied neither of these prerequisites -- is listed in the ER as one of the nine communities that had passed that 1988 test and remained under consideration as a potential host community.
In fact, there is no contemporaneous documentation indicating that Homer was considered as a community location for the CEC facility or had even been identified as a site for consideration before May 22, 1989, less than 3 weeks before Senator Bennett Johnston announced on June 9, 1989 that Homer had been selected as the location for the CEC facility. As late as May 17, 1989, when Larry Engwall, who had taken charge of the site selection process, presented his short list of six potential sites for the CEC facility to the LES steering committee with an accompanying Kepner-Tregoe analysis, Homer was not on that list.{154} In his deposition, Mr. Engwall could not recall that Homer was even a candidate for consideration in April of 1989, and admittedly did not visit Homer until late May 1989.{155} Nor is there any indication in the files of how or why, in late May 1989, Homer was suddenly not only in the running but a serious contender for the facility.
Thus, in contrast to the information contained in the ER (and parroted in the EIS), Homer was not among the 21 communities actually considered during Phase 1 of the intermediate screening in 1988, nor was it originally one of the communities subjected to the Kepner-Tregoe analysis in Phase II of the Intermediate Screening stage. Instead, it was given special treatment and put into the process at the last moment. This disparate and preferential treatment of Homer, which is concealed in the ER, raises fundamental questions about the objectivity and integrity of the site selection process, including whether sites and communities were considered impartially with regard to environmental impact-related factors.
Not only are the ER and EIS inaccurate in their representation of how Homer was evaluated during the site selection process, but they are inaccurate in their depiction of numerous other aspects of that process. The underlying documents reflect glaring gaps and inconsistencies with respect to such significant factors as (a) the numbers and identities of communities and sites that were considered, (b) the sequence and timing at which various communities and site alternatives were screened out, (c) the nature of the criteria that were used at various stages of the site selection process, (d) the weighting of criteria for the Kepner-Tregoe analysis, and (e) the scores that were assigned for particular criteria.
As a general matter, LES kept extremely poor records of the site selection process. As noted in 1990 by an official from Duke Engineering Services, Inc. who had reviewed the site selection files, "it is difficult to reconstruct the site selection process based upon the documentation in the files."{156} William Schaperkotter, who was responsible for the Coarse and Phase I Intermediate Screening stages, admitted that he generally relied on "face-to-face" meetings rather than maintaining documents.{157} LES' poor recordkeeping contradicted the guidance of the Kepner-Tregoe method, which stresses the importance of maintaining good records of the decisionmaking process, so that a decision "can be reconstructed logically in all its detail."{158} Adherence to the Kepner-Tregoe method, in which both Mr. Schaperkotter and Mr. Engwall received at least a week of training,{159} is supposed to allow "[e]very step in thinking and in dealing with information" to be "shown and duplicated."{160} This "allows for error-checking and for augmentation as new information becomes available." It also "simplifies communication and explanation of the decision. As has been shown, anyone outside the decision team, asking why [a particular alternative] was judged 25% better than the other, can be shown point by point exactly why this is so."{161} In this case, anyone outside LES' site selection decisonmaking process who tried to determine, based on the contemporaneous documentation maintained by LES, exactly what criteria were used, how they were weighted, and on what factual basis they were scored, would find it virtually impossible.
A few examples provide a sense of the pervasive extent of the gaps and inconsistencies in the documentation of the site selection process. The ER and the EIS represent, for example, that at the end of Phase I of the Intermediate Screening process, the number of candidate communities was reduced from 21 to 9.{162} However, the May 1989 report to the LES Steering Committee showed only six remaining candidate communities, and, as discussed above, Homer was not among them. In addition, contemporaneous documents show that two of the communities listed as having been dropped during this phase -- Armistead and Plain Dealing -- were under active consideration until at least mid-May, 1989, and probably beyond. In an August 1989 presentation by Larry Engwall, both communities are identified as having been finalists at the community level of screening.{163} The documentation provided to CANT contains no explanation for these inconsistencies in the evaluation of Armistead and Plain Dealing. Conversely, Oak Grove and Columbia, which are listed in the ER as among the nine remaining candidate communities, are not represented on other documents in which site selection personnel presented the final list of candidate communities to the LES Steering Committee.{164}
Similarly, while the ER and the EIS report that a list of 21 candidate communities was reduced to 9, other documents say that the list of 21 was narrowed to 11 communities.{165} Another example of such discrepancies can be seen at the Fine Screening stage. In the ER, LES states that at this stage, it considered six sites in Homer, narrowing the field to three sites, then one.{166} However, a memorandum written by Peter LeRoy in 1990 states that eleven sites in Claiborne Parish were considered.{167} Thus, the record contains significant discrepancies with respect to the identity and number of communities or sites under consideration, as well as the sequence and timing at which various communities and site alternatives were screened out.
There are also significant discrepancies in the documentation regarding the nature of the criteria that were used at various stages of the site selection process. For instance, May and August 1989 reports to the LES Steering Committee on the progress and results of the site selection process show that the site selection criteria included a "must" factor that electric service needed to be available.{168} Plain Dealing and Armistead, which the ER asserts were dropped from consideration early in the process (i.e., in 1988) because they were not in an "LP&L service area," are listed in the 1989 reports as candidates that meet the electric service criterion. It appears that not until the ER was written was this criterion changed from "electric service available" to "LP&L service area." Similarly, a weighted criterion called "manufacturing mentality" appears in the ER, but does not appear in the earlier reports to the LES Steering Committee which purport to describe the site selection process.
The numbers and nature of the criteria in contemporaneous documents are also different than those represented in the ER. For instance, the ER lists 14 criteria (four "musts" and ten "wants") for Phase 2 of the Intermediate Screening stage.{169} However, Larry Engwall's August 24, 1989, presentation to the LES Steering Committee, which was made over two months after the intermediate screening portion of the site selection had been completed and the Homer area had been selected for the facility, shows a set of 18 somewhat different and more numerous criteria (4 "musts" and 14 weighted "wants") for a stage which appears to be equivalent to Phase 2 of the Intermediate Screening stage.{170} The record contains no explanation for this inconsistency.
There is virtually no discussion in the contemporaneous files of the qualitative reasons for the basis for the numerical scores that were calculated based on the weighted criteria in the Kepner-Tregoe analyses. The site selection files for individual communities contained only three individual Kepner-Tregoe site analyses, for the communities of Plain Dealing, Winnsboro, and Armistead. The analyses appear to track the ones found in Larry Engwall's presentation in May 1989, and not those found in the ER or elsewhere. For the remaining community sites considered, there are no individual analyses to support the varying scores assigned the individual communities on the different analyses.
There is also great inconsistency in the scores that were assigned for particular criteria. For a given site, the score may differ by a few points, with the weighted score differing by more than ten points, depending on the chart examined -- and no explanation is given for these discrepancies. For example, with respect to the "livability" criterion in the EIS and the apparently comparable "quality of life" criterion found in discovery documents, Arcadia scored a 10 in Larry Engwall's May 1989 presentation.{171} According to his August 1989 presentation, Arcadia scored a 7 in the first phase of intermediate screening and an 8 at the second phase of the intermediate screening. In the ER and the EIS, it scored a 7.{172} Since the "want-weight" for livability and quality of life was 9, these inconsistencies result in a 30-point discrepancy in the weighted score for this criterion. The record contains no explanation for these discrepancies.
The documentation also shows discrepancies in Kepner-Trego scores for Winnsboro, which was Homer's closest competitor in Phase II of the Intermediate Screening process. In Figure 7.1-7 of the ER, Winnsboro is given a score of 6 for "distance to metro area," which has a want-weight of 8. The total weighted score for Winnsboro is 716, or 15 points lower than Homer. But at another page in the ER, Winnsboro gets a score of 9 for distance to metro area.{173} The total weighted score for Winnsboro in this table is still given as 716, but this is a miscalculation -- it should be 749 -- 18 points higher than Homer. Clearly, the error is important -- if the first score were correct, then Winnsboro would have been the top contender. However, because of the lack of contemporaneous documentation of the basis for assigning scores, it is impossible to determine from the record which is the correct score.
Similarly, with respect to the criteria of "availability of maintenance services" (which is given a "want-weight of 6), Winnsboro scored a 9 in the Kepner-Tregoe analysis of communities, as represented in Larry Engwall's May 1989 Engwall presentation.{174} In contrast, according to his August 1989 presentation, Winnsboro scored a 7 and an 8 in two separate Intermediate Screening analyses.{175} In the ER, LES gave Winnsboro a score of 7. This one-point difference in the score results in a 6-point discrepancy in the weighted score. Again, no explanation is given for this discrepancy.
Another curious discrepancy exists with respect to LES' alleged timing and reasons for eliminating Armistead from consideration. The ER states that Armistead was eliminated in Phase 1 of the Intermediate Screening stage -- which took place in 1988 -- in part because it was "flood prone."{176} However, a year later, and over two months after the Intermediate Screening stage had been concluded and Homer chosen as the candidate community, Larry Engwall presented a chart to the Steering Committee demonstrating that Armistead had satisfied the "must" criterion for flood risk, and had proceeded to consideration as one of the final candidate communities.{177}
Comparable discrepancies can also be found at the Fine Screening stage. For instance, the ER reports that the LeSage site was given a score of 9 for distance from institutions, with a weighted score of 72.{178} The EIS, as well as a report that Mr. Engwall prepared in the summer of 1989, give the LeSage site a score of 10, with a weighted score of 80.{179} Again, there is no contemporaneous documentation in the files which would indicate which score is correct.
Thus, the contemporaneous records of the site selection process are full of gaps and inconsistencies. One gets a different picture of the site selection process, depending on the document that is being reviewed. There are different numbers of communities evaluated at what is apparently the same stage of analysis; there are different lists of criteria; and there are different communities which make it to the final level of intermediate or community level screening. Nor is there virtually any contemporaneous documentation setting forth the basis for the different Kepner-Tregoe analyses.
These examples are merely illustrative. There are numerous other inconsistencies and irregularities. These problems are significant because they demonstrate that it is impossible to determine what actually occurred during the site selection process that resulted in the selection of Forest Grove and Center Spring as the location of the facility. Since it cannot be determined what occurred, there is no basis for evaluating the objectivity and reliability of the judgments that LES made. This is especially true where many factors, such as community support, opinion leader unity, manufacturing mentality are inherently subjective. In this case, the site selection process was so poorly documented, inconsistent, and in fact capricious, that it could not be found to constitute a reliable, objective, or valid basis for making decisions involving evaluation, avoidance, or mitigation of the environmental impacts of the proposed plant. In fact, the irregularities and inconsistencies in the site selection process raise an inference of bias.
FOOTNOTES********************************
{1} See also "Toxic Wastes and Race Revisited" (Center for Policy Alternatives: 1994) (finding that despite growing national attention to the issue of environmental justice, people of color today are more likely than whites to live in communities with commercial hazardous waste facilities than they were a decade ago.
{2} Browner, introductory statement to EPA Draft Environmental Justice Strategy for Executive Order 12898 (January 1995).
{3} Id.
{4} This working definition has also been adopted by EPA's National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC).
{5} Exhibit 4.
{6} Id. at 1.
{7} Id.
{8} The draft plan also states that environmental justice issues were considered in this licensing case. Id. at 4. However, as discussed in my testimony, the discussion is entirely inadequate, and does not reflect any considered application of environmental justice principles.
{9} Robert D. Bullard, "Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community," Sociological Inquiry 53 (Spring 1983) at 273-288; Robert D. Bullard, Invisible Houston: The Black Experience in Boom and Bust, (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), Chapter 6; Robert D. Bullard, "Environmental Racism and Land Use," Land Use Forum: A Journal of Law, Policy & Practice 2 (Spring, 1993): 6-11.
{10} United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race; Paul Mohai and Bunyan Bryant, "Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence," at 163-176.
{11} Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle, "Unequal Protection," National Law Journal (September 21, 1992) at S1-S2.
{12} Bullard, "Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community," supra.
{13} U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), "Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities" (Washington, DC: 1983).
{14} United Church of Christ, Toxic Wastes and Race, supra.
{15} Bullard, Invisible Houston, supra; Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class and Environmental Quality, supra; Robert D. Bullard, "In Our Backyards: Minority Communities Get Most of the Dumps," EPA Journal 18 (March/April, 1992) at 11-12; Robert D. Bullard, "Unequal Environmental Protection: Incorporating Environmental Justice in Decision Making," supra, at 237-266; Adam M. Finkel and Dominic Golding, eds., Worst Things First: The Debate Over Risk-Based National Environmental Priorities (Resources for the Future: 1994); Bullard, Unequal Protection, supra; United Church of Christ, Toxic Wastes, supra; Benjamin A. Goldman and Lauri Fitton, Toxic Waste and Race Revisited, (Center for Policy Alternatives: 1994); Leslie A. Nieves, "Not in Whose Backyard? Minority Population Concentrations and Noxious Facility Sites," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Chicago, Il. (February, 1991); D.R. Wernette and L.A. Nieves, "Breathing Polluted Air: Minorities are Disproportionately Exposed," EPA Journal 18 (March/April, 1992) at 16-17; Bryant and Mohai, Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards, supra; Lavelle and Coyle, "Unequal Protection," supra; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Toxic Release Inventory & Emission Reductions 1987-1990 in the Lower Mississippi River Corridor, (1993); Louisiana Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Battle for Environmental Justice in Louisiana... Government, Industry, and the People (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Regional Office, Kansas City: 1993).
{16} See R.D. Bullard, ed., Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots, supra.
{17} See, R.D. Bullard, ed., Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice and Communities of Color. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1994.
{18} ER at 7.1-7.
{19} While minority communities do host a disproportionate share of prisons, half-way houses and mental institutions, common and generally dispersed institutions such as schools, hospitals, and nursing homes, are poorly represented in minority communities.
{20} FEIS, Section 4.2.1.7.4.
{21} Final EIS at 4-35.
{22} Id.
{23} EIS at 4-35.
{24} Id.
{25} Id.
{26} Id.
{27} Id. at 4-35. The EIS also concludes that there is no evidence of "racial considerations being used in the site selection process." Id. This issue is discussed later in my testimony, with respect to the issue of procedural equity.
{28} In comparison, the racial composition of Claiborne Parish was 53.43 white, 46.09 African American, 0.16 percent American Indian, 0.07 percent Asian, 0.23 Hispanic, and 0.01 percent "other" in 1990. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 U.S. Population and Housing. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1992.
{29} The EIS claims that only 13 residences in the area rely on groundwater wells. FEIS at 3-32. However, this estimate is based on a superficial survey that did not accurately identify all of the wells in the area. In fact, at least 40 residences rely on groundwater wells. Comment of Eula Mae Malone on scoping of EIS (July 1991) (Exhibit 5).
{30} U.S. Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3A (1990).
{31} Id.
{32} U.S. Census, Summary Tape File 3A, United States Summary (1990).
{33} Id.
{34} U.S. Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3A (1990).
{35} U.S. Bureau of the Census, Summary Tape File 3A United States Summary (1990).
{36} Id.
{37} U.S. Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3A (1990).
{38} Id.
{39} Bureau of the Census, Summary Tape File 3A United States Summary (199).
{40} The layout of Forest Grove and Center Springs is depicted in a handwritten map prepared by Norton Tompkins in 1992, which is attached as Exhibit 6. This map is based on a thorough on-foot inspection of the Forest Grove and Center Springs areas.
{41} FEIS at 4-31.
{42} FEIS at 4-62.
{43} FEIS at 4-63.
{44} FEIS at 4-63.
{45} FEIS at 4-38.
{46} Although the discussion of a UF6 storage area fire states that in addition to uranyl fluoride, hydrofluoric acid would be contained in the airborne plume released from the site, the EIS does not address the HF "uptake" -- or inhalation/exposure -- by individuals at various distances from the site. As acknowledged in NUREG-1391, Chemical Toxicity of Uranium Hexafluoride Compared to Acute Effects of Radiation at 2 (NRC: 1991), HF in sufficient concentrations can burn the skin and lungs. Fluorine is also poisonous in sufficiently large quantities. Id.
{47} FEIS at 4-63.
{48} Id.
{49} Final Rule, Emergency Preparedness For Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees, 54 Fed. Reg. 14,051, 14,052 (April 7, 1989).
{50} Id.
{51} Id., 54 Fed. Reg. at 14,052.
{52} Clifford J. Earl, Prefiled Testimony on CANT's Contention J (July 1, 1994).
{53} FEIS at 4-5.
{54} Id. at 4-7.
{55} FEIS at 4-7.
{56} FEIS at 4-25 (emphasis added).
{57} Letter from Charles J. Haughney to W. Howard Arnold, Enclosure at 4 (June 25, 1991). Exhibit 7.
{58} The Forest Grove Hunting Club was formed in 1984. Mr. V.O. Seals, an 84-year old homeowner in Forest Grove, leases out part of his 104 acres for hunting and fishing. His land adjoins the property line of the proposed site. The land has been in his family for over a 100 years. He is vehemently opposed to the CEC (Interview with Mr. Seals, December 10, 1994).
{59} FEIS at 2-38, 2-52.
{60} FEIS at 4-21.
{61} Id.
{62} FEIS at 4-22.
{63} Id.
{64} FEIS at 4-24.
{65} EIS at 4-10.
{66} Id.
{67} ER, Table 4.1-2.
{68} EIS at 4-28.
{69} Id.
{70} Id. (emphasis added)
{71} Id.
{72} Id.
{73} FEIS at 4-10.
{74} Id.
{75} FEIS at 4-12.
{76} FEIS at 2-29 - 2-30, Figure 2.9.
{77} FEIS at 4-28.
{78} FEIS at 4-12. 4-35.
{79} FEIS at 4-12.
{80} FEIS at 4-13.
{81} FEIS at 4-31.
{82} Id.
{83} FEIS at 4-31.
{84} FEIS at 4-31 - 4-32.
{85} FEIS at 4-32.
{86} FEIS at 4-84.
{87} EIS at 4-86.
{88} Id.
{89} For a discussion of the impact of housing barriers on mobility of African Americans, see Robert D. Bullard, J. Eugene Grigsby, III, and Charles Lee, eds., Residential Apartheid: The American Legacy, supra.
{90} Notably, as discussed above, the FEIS emphasized its assessment of "social, economic, and community" impacts on the towns of Homer and Haynesville, which are relatively distant from the site. FEIS at 4-31.
{91} EIS at 4-83.
{92} "Race plays an integral part in . . . municipal service delivery." Bullard, Dumping in Dixie at 6.
{93} FEIS at 4-32.
{94} FEIS at 4-32 - 4-33.
{95} FEIS at 4-77.
{96} FEIS at 4-32.
{97} FEIS at 4-33.
{98} FEIS at 4-32.
{99} FEIS at 4-33.
{100} FEIS at 4-33.
{101} EIS at 4-33.
{102} FEIS at 2-3.
{103} Id.
{104} Id.
{105} ER, Section 7.1.1.
{106} ER, Section 7.1.2.1.
{107} ER, Section 7.1.2.2.
{108} ER at 7.1-6.
{109} The weighted scores for the four highest ranking communities are shown at page 7.1-8 of the ER.
{110} ER, Section 7.1.3.1.
{111} ER, Section 7.1.3.3.
{112} FEIS at 2-3, 2-19.
{113} FEIS at 4-24.
{114} Id.
{115} Deposition of William S. Schaperkotter at 145 (December 21, 1994) (Exhibit 8); deposition of Larry Engwall at 126 (January 26, 1995) (Exhibit 9); deposition of William J. Dorsey at 86-87 (December 21, 1995) (Exhibit 10).
{116} Dorsey deposition at 82-83.
{117} "Poor Households as Percent of Total County Households - 1989." Map and analysis by the Southern Regional Council, Voting Rights Programs. August 1993. Data Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990 Census of Population - (STF-3A/P127). Exhibit 11.
{118} "Black Population as Percent of Total County Population." Map and analysis by the Southern Regional Council, Voting Rights Programs, 1993. Source of Data: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population and Housing. Exhibit 12
{119} Id.
{120} DEIS at 3-108.
{121} Because LES' site selection documentation is so contradictory, it is difficult to determine how many sites were actually considered at any particular point in time by LES. However, counsel for LES stated in discovery that an undated document entitled "Numerical listing (1-58) of potential sites", and a "Huge topo map - 1982 Bastrop/Louisiana - Mississippi (32091-EI-TM-100)" provide the most comprehensive listing of sites that were considered. See letter from Robert L. Draper to Diane Curran (November 2, 1994). Exhibit 13. Based on these documents, the ACLU was able to identify, by description and/or map location, 79 candidate sites. Because one of these sites, the Armistead Cagean site, was identified on the list of 58, but was not clearly identified on the map, it was not considered in the analysis.
{122} The twenty sites that were not identified on the list of 58 sites were placed in the appropriate parish by map location for computation purposes, rather than attempting to associate each unidentified site with a particular community. An exception to this was made for Homer, where six sites that were not included in the list of 58 sites were all identified in the draft and final EIS as being considered connected with the Town of Homer.
{123} ER at 7.1-2 - 7.1-3.
{124} ER at 7.1-7.
{125} ER at 7.1-6, 7.1-7.
{126} ER at 7.1-7.
{127} Engwall deposition at 119.
{128} ER at 7.1-9.
{129} Applicant's Second Supplemental Response to Intervenor's Interrogatories Dated August 16, 1994, Pertaining to Contentions B, I, J, K, Q, and W at 31 (December 7, 1994).
{130} Applicant's Second Supplemental Response to Intervenor's Interrogatories Dated August 16, 1994, Pertaining to Contentions B, I, J, K, Q, and W at 13, 20-21, 47.
{131} Engwall deposition at 83.
{132} Engwall deposition at 83.
{133} Applicant's Second Supplemental Response to Intervenor's Interrogatories Dated August 16, 1994, Pertaining to Contentions B, I, J, K, Q, and W at 55-60, referencing pages 20-21.
{134} ER at 7.1-9.
{135} ER at 7.1-7.
{136} Engwall deposition at 106.
{137} Engwall deposition at 105 - 106.
{138} ER, Figure 7.1-8.
{139} Engwall deposition at 105.
{140} Engwall deposition at 108.
{141} It could also have affected the score for Forest Grove and Center Springs, since the scoring is done on a relative basis. Looking at all the sites, "the best gets a ten," and the others are scored in comparison. Engwall deposition at 104.
{142} Id. at 102.
{143} Id.
{144} Engwall deposition at 102-103, ER at 77.1-6 - 77.1-7.
{145} Engwall deposition at 110.
{146} Engwall deposition at 109.
{147} ER at 7.1-6 - 7.1-8 and Figure 7.1-7
{148} ER at 7.1-9 -- 7.1-11 and Figures 7.1-8 and 7.1-9.
{149} ER at 7.1-6 (emphasis added).
{150} Schaperkotter deposition at 31.
{151} See note 121, above.
{152} Schaperkotter deposition at 62.
{153} Schaperkotter deposition at 59.
{154} CEPP Centrifuge Enrichment Plan Project, Site Selection Study (May 17, 1989) (hereinafter "May 17 Site Selection Study"). Exhibit 14.
{155} Engwall deposition at 52.
{156} Letter from A.M. Segrest to R.D. Belprez (July 30, 1990) (Exhibit 15).
{157} Schaperkotter deposition at 45.
{158} Charles H. Kepner and Benjamin B. Tregoe, The New Rational Manager at 110 (Princeton Research Press: 1981).
{159} Schaperkotter deposition at 38; Engwall deposition at 10.
{160} The New Rational Manager at 110.
{161} Id.
{162} ER at 7.1-6, EIS at 2-12. .
{163} Site Recommendation for the Centrifuge Enrichment Plan Project, Submitted to the Executive Steering Committee of Louisiana Energy (August 1989) ("August 1989 Site Recommendation Report"), Figure 5-2. Exhibit 16
{164} See May 1989 Site Selection Study, August 1989 Site Recommendation Report
{165} See e.g., August 1989 Site Recommendation Report at 18.
{166} ER at 7.1-9.
{167} Memorandum to file from Peter LeRoy, Attachment 5, "Alternative Sites" (June 13, 1990). Exhibit 17.
{168} May 1989 Site Selection Study, Table entitled "Urenco Site Search - Kepner-Tregoe Analysis"; August 1989 Site Recommendation Report, Figure 5-2.
{169} FEIS at 7.1-7.
{170} August 1989 Site Recommendation Report, Figure 5-2.
{171} May 1989 Site Selection Study, Table entitled Urenco Site Search - Kepner-Tregoe Analysis.
{172} August 1989 Site Recommendation Report, Figures 5-1, 5-2.
{173} ER at 7.1-8.
{174} Table entitled "Urenco Site Search - Kepner-Tregoe Analysis."
{175} August 1989 Site Recommendation Report, Figures 5-1 and 5-2.
{176} ER at 7.1-6.
{177} August 1989 Site Recommendation Report, Figure 5-2.
{178} ER, Figure 7.1-8.
{179} FEIS at 2-20, Site Recommendation Report, Figure 6-1.